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Introduction 
There are many similarities between the trade and water nexus and the trade and 
climate nexus.  This is because the trade, water and climate communities face the 
common problem of free riding associated to a “public good”.  Free riding is well 
recognized in the case of water (and climate) even if water should not be treated as a 
pure public good (defined by non-rivalry and non-exclusion) but only as a local and 
common pool resource (Perry et al., 1997).  Water resources become rivalrous only 
once the level of water exhaustion is reached (then their consumption by one 
individual reduces their availability for consumption by others).  And, they are often 
non-excludable because of the failure to implement efficient property rights, such as 
those illustrated by the centuries-old system of “bisses” in Valais (a Swiss region).  
That said, today water production and consumption are subject to free-riding largely 
because domestic water policies are non-existing or embryonic:  pricing mechanisms 
are not developed, externalities (water over-use, excessive use of pesticides and 
fertilizers, etc.) are not taken into account, etc. 
In sharp contrast, the fact that freer trade is also largely subject to free-riding is 
often ignored today.  However, the free-riding instinct re-emerges each time when, 
despite robust economic analysis and history, countries believe that they would be 
better off if they impose tariffs on their imports while getting free access to the 
markets of the rest of the world.  If few today realize that freer trade is a public good, 
it is because the existing world trade regime has been very successful in inducing 
countries to limit their strong free-riding instincts in trade matters.  Benefits from 
freer trade are bigger and faster to emerge because many countries move together 
within a well-designed world trade regime based on GATT/WTO principles and rules 
(in this paper, “rules” are meant subordinate to principles). 
There is another deep connection between trade, water and climate.  It is widely 
recognized that forecasting future climate shocks at a regional level—which regions 
will be flooded, which ones will be under water stress on a year by year basis—is 
largely out of reach.  In such circumstances, trade gets back a role that has faded 
away during the last sixty years of relatively stable climatic, economic and political 
conditions.  It is to be the ultimate insurer.  Regions under sudden water stress will 
need to import food products in exceptional quantities, and trade happens to be a 
cheap (efficient) insurance scheme to face a sudden instability in water resources in 
some parts of the world. 
There are thus good reasons to look at whether the world trade regime could 
provide a strong and sound framework to the international water regime.  Not many 
papers have looked at this issue (Yang and Zehnder 2007, Hoekstra 2010).  They 
generally see the WTO as a source of problems rather than of solutions.  Hence, they 
argue for specific international agreements on water.  But, the climate community 
experience of the COP15 (the 2009 Copenhagen Summit on Climate Change) is a 
strong warning signal showing how difficult it is to build a “specific” international 
regime. 
In contrast, this paper argues that the basic principles on which the world trade 
regime is built would be equally useful for the international water regime, and that the 
WTO rules are flexible enough to address the specific problems raised by water 
management in an international context.  It also argues that, if current international 
trade mirrors domestic distortions, limiting such trade will cost a lot in terms of water 
use.  Killing the messenger (trade) does not solve the problems (domestic markets). 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a broad insight on how 
trade analysis shows the beneficial aspect of a more integrated international trade in 
water and how trade and water issues can be mutually supportive.  Section 3 raises 
two questions.  Do we need a specific international agreement for “trading water” 
(the various forms of such a trade are explained in section 3)?  Do we need specific 
international agreements for producing water in sustainable quantity and quality?  
The paper argues that the answer to the first question is no.  The World Trade 
Organization (WTO) rules are both sound and flexible enough to address the key 
issues raised by water trade.  The second question has a more complex answer.  
The paper suggests that some WTO rules may need to be revisited, but that such 
revisions are unlikely to create serious problems if they are carefully handled from a 
water and trade perspective. 
1. Water and trade economics 
Before looking at water economics in an international trade setting, two crucial 
remarks should be made. First, trade is the mere difference between domestic 
consumption and production.  Import is the excess of domestic consumption over 
domestic production, export the converse.  If domestic production and/or 
consumption are distorted, trade is distorted.  For instance, if producers in the 
exporting and importing countries do not take into account negative externalities 
(pollution), the exporting country could export too much water-intensive goods and 
the importing country could import not enough such goods. 
The fact that trade is a mere difference has a key corollary.  It is that taking 
measures for restricting or increasing water trade is not the adequate solution to 
address production and consumption externalities since it does not address the initial 
problems raised by imperfect domestic water markets (production and/or 
consumption).  These problems could be satisfactorily solved only by measures 
targeting domestic markets—better pricing mechanisms, more appropriate subsidies 
and/or taxes favouring investment and delivering productivity gains. 
That said, if acting on international trade is not the solution, the rules of the 
world trade regime, if well interpreted, have the capacity to be conducive of improved 
domestic market disciplines, as underscored in section 3.  This has already happened.  
The last sixty years have witnessed increased market access (trade liberalization) in 
industrial products as a force pushing for reducing distortions in domestic markets in 
order to reap all the benefits from trade opening. 
The second crucial preliminary remark is that, contrary to the politicians’ and 
people’s views, economists underscore the fact that imports capture the gains from 
trade, whereas exports mirror the costs of trade.  Countries export only because they 
have to pay for imports.  Exporting too much is as bad as importing too little.  This 
is particularly obvious in the water sector where trade does not only generate 
movements of goods, but also entails exchanges of the quantity of water “embedded” 
in commodities—hence the concept of “virtual” water (the amount of water required 
to produce a good is “virtually” exchanged among countries through trade flows).  In 
short, a country saves its scarce water resources by relying on imports, while it 
increases its water use by exporting water-intensive goods. 
1.1 Comparative advantages 
Middle East’s virtual water imports in the form of grains are equivalent to the 
flow of the river Nile in a year (Allan 2003).  Explaining such trade flows requires 
nothing more than a direct application of comparative advantages theories (Wichelns 
2010).  The virtual water notion is thus a relatively new concept based on 
well-established ideas in international economics. 
The theory of comparative advantages splits into two main tenants:  the 
Ricardian theory and the Heckscher-Ohlin theory (hereafter HO).  Both analyses 
show that by specializing in productions for which they enjoy a relative advantage, 
countries opening to trade breed a process that drives to a globally and economically 
more efficient use of resources than in autarky.  These theories of comparative 
advantages tell us that all countries have an interest to trade, even if they have only a 
relative advantage in the production of some goods.  That a country may produce all 
the goods more costly than its trading partner does not prevent it to have a relative 
(comparative) advantage in the goods it produces in a relatively less costly way than 
its trading partner. 
The Ricardian approach perceives comparative advantages as arising from 
technology-driven differences in factor productivities among countries.  Indeed, 
Ricardo used “climate differences” to express the relative productivities of two 
trading partners to engage into trade.  The opportunity cost of using water as an input 
(compared across countries) is what drives Ricardian comparative advantages (for 
more, see below Table 1). 
By contrast, the HO approach perceives countries’ comparative advantage as 
determined by the relative abundance in production factors (capital, labour and natural 
resources, such as water) among countries.  Shifting to HO offers an interesting 
perspective.  International trade in goods is rooted in exchanges of factor services 
through which a country can “enlarge” its scarce and relatively unavailable resources.  
In this sense, the concept illustrates how trade in goods can be a substitute to factors’ 
(such as water) immobility among distant countries and that trade is mutually 
beneficial.  So, trade may have an alleviating impact on water stress nationally, 
regionally, and globally if a trade policy allows for the full beneficial effect of these 
forces.  In this context, trade can entail positive externalities by contributing to 
favour efficient water uses globally. 
Table 1 illustrates the two approaches.  It displays labour force (active 
population), land and water endowments as well as factor intensities for 2000 in ten 
countries.  Compared to the situation in France, China benefits from large 
endowments in labour, water and land (columns 1, 2 and 3).  Yet, in terms of water 
endowments, China is relatively more abundant in labour and less abundant in land 
than France (column 4 and 5).  In Column (6), relative water requirements of 
countries are reported with respect to France.  This means that a country with a ratio 
above unity is less efficient in producing wheat than France.  For instance Canada 
with a high water endowment and being more water intensive than France (Canada’s 
amount of water per worker is higher) has nonetheless lower water productivity in 
wheat than France.  The sample used here is too narrow to draw general conclusions.  
It however conveys the idea that a country may well be Heckscher-Ohlinian with one 
country and Ricardian with another.  This pledges for considering both sources of 
comparative advantages.  It is crucial to see also that both types of comparative 
advantage need to be implemented if one wants to correctly capture the virtual water 
issue.  
 
Table 1: Water, land and labor endowments and factors intensities (2000) 
    Heckscher-Ohlin approach Ricardian approach 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Renewable 
water [a] 
Uncategorized 
labour [b] 
Arable 
land [b] 
Water per 
workers 
Water per Ha 
of arable land 
Wheat productivity 
relative to France [c] 
Brazil 8,233 77 58 106 142 1.8 
Canada 2,902 16 46 183 63 1.7 
China 2,830 737 133 3.8 21 0.7 
Egypt 87 19 3 5 29 2 
France 204 26 18 8 11 1 
India 1,908 402 163 5 12 1.9 
Israel 2 2 0.3 1 7 3.7 
Japan 430 68 4 6 108 0.8 
Mexico 457 34 25 13 18 1.2 
United States 2,071 141 175 15 12 0.9 
Notes: [a] International Labor Organization of the United Nations. [b] Food and Agriculture organization of the United Nations. 
[c] Ratio of each country water requirement for wheat production to the one of France. If the ratio is above one then the country 
has a lower productivity than France (and vice versa). 
 
1.2 From trade theories to water realities 
Literature has provided evidence that virtual water flows of a country is not 
necessarily related to the abundance and/or scarcity of renewable freshwater (Yang 
and Zhender 2007). Yet, one must distinguish between the water content of trade e.g. 
(virtual water) and trade itself. This distinction means that even if virtual water is not 
related to abundance in water, water availability   may still play a role in shaping 
trade flows.  And, the HO model refers to predictions concerning trade in goods and 
not to implicit trade in the factor services embodied in those goods (e.g. virtual water).  
It is thus incorrect to mobilize the HO theorem and to conclude on its poor 
performance when one investigates the relationship between virtual water flows and 
water endowments (Kumar and Singh, 2005; Verma et al. 2007).  In this theoretical 
context we need to look at trade flows only. 
Does the HO model perform well in this context?  An extensive test of the HO 
model provides evidence that international trade is well explained by the relative 
uneven distribution of production factors including water resources (Le Vernoy, 
2010a).  In other words, trade in agricultural products is effectively shaped by the 
relative abundance and/or scarcity of water. And, this is sufficient to conclude that the 
virtual water concept is a useful tool to connect the trade and water nexus. 
That said, there are very good reasons to look at the HO model as an imperfect 
model to capture perfectly the water situation.  These imperfections are examined by 
increasing order of importance. 
First, while water is still largely immobile among distant countries the question 
of contiguous nations sharing common resources should be integrated.  Further 
research could relax the assumption of perfect immobility by acknowledging the 
strategic importance of the existence of upstream/downstream relationship between 
any two trading partners (Ambec and Ehlers 2007). Second, other determinants may 
be at work, such as geographical and institutional characteristics of each trading 
partners and distortive trade policies.  Geography and climate play a major role (the 
issue of distortive trade policy instruments is discussed in the next section). Last but 
not least, the pricing mechanism in the water sector is highly distorted.  Many 
countries do not charge a price for water, especially for by far the largest water 
users—farmers.  Water is not priced at all in some countries, pushing the water 
sector into a “tragedy of the commons”.  Failures to ensure accurate property rights 
of the resource should be managed through adequate price mechanisms and 
regulations.  An even more widespread reason is the question of subsidies. Many 
countries subsidized water provision to a point that the signal of scarcity is totally 
distorted (Boulanger, 2007). 
2. Are WTO disciplines appropriate to water trade? 
At the onset of this section, it is important to ask the following question.  What 
would be the cost of rejecting the WTO-based approach that today rules virtual water?  
Such a refusal would open the possibility of banning imports and/or exports any time.  
Estimates suggest that current virtual water trade allows saving, on average, 22 
percent of the world water [Chapagain et al. 2006].  This figure represents a rough 
estimate of the minimal opportunity cost of rejecting a WTO-based approach.  And 
this is despite the fact that the current trade regime is not fully developed in order to 
address water issues and that it operates under very distortive domestic water policies 
(no pricing mechanism and recognition of externalities). 
 
Table 2.  Implicit tariff rates on virtual water, 2007 
 
In this context, examining the use of the WTO disciplines in the water sector 
raises three questions.  Is water a tradable good?  Are the two key WTO principles 
(national treatment and most-favored nation) appropriate pilars for a water trade 
regime?  Do the other WTO rules accompanying the WTO principles (again, in the 
paper context, “rules” are subordinate to principles) offer the flexibility that may be 
needed by the specifics of water trade? 
2.1 Is water a tradable good? 
This question has received a positive answer from an economic perspective in 
section 1.  What follows deals with the international law-related aspects of the issue.  
In other words, can water be seen as a tradable good in the WTO legal context? A first 
answer can be found in the tariff classification (the so-called “Harmonized System”, 
or HS) which describes the whole universe of products and is used by every Customs 
in the world.  In this context, it is useful to make a basic distinction between 
freshwater and waters having a saleable form (for instance, bottled waters).  This 
latter form is clearly within the WTO scope since there are tariff lines for saleable 
waters (see Table 3 under the HS 2201-10 code). 
    Applied tariffs (%)   Bound tariffs (%) 
    
Developed 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
and LDCs 
All 
countries  
  
Developed 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
and LDCs 
All 
countries  
Fishery 2.2 15.1 14.2  2.5 34.2 31.4 
Forestry 0.6 6.5 6.1  1.2 28.9 26.5 
Fuels 0.5 6.2 5.8  1.5 27.5 25.3 
Mining 0.8 6 5.7  1.6 30.9 28.6 
All merchandise imports 5.4 10.7 10.3   [c] [c] [c] 
Virtual water: animal [a] 2.8 10.5 6.7  22.3 58.1 40.2 
 water requirements [b] 6726 10066 8396  6726 10066 8396 
Virtual water: crops [a] 5.6 13.8 9.7  28.6 58.9 43.8 
  water requirements [b] 3319 5753 4536   3319 5753 4536 
Source, WTO Report 2010, pp. 114-115, WITS.  [a]  Virtual water associated to animals and crops.  [b]  
Average water requirements (cubic meter per ton).  [c]  non available in the WTO Table 8, p.115. 
 Table 3.  Water in the Harmonized System of classification of goods 
Headings/Subheading Article Description 
22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar 
2201 Unsweetened beverage waters, ice and snow 
2201-10 Mineral and aerated waters not sweetened or flavoured 
2201-90 Ice, snow and potable water not sweetened or flavoured 
Source: UN Comtrade commodities list description. http://comtrade.un.org/   Note :  Chapter 22 does 
not cover:  (i) products of this chapter (other than those of heading 2209) prepared for culinary purposes 
and thereby rendered unsuitable for consumption as beverages (generally heading 2103);  (ii) sea water 
(heading 2501);  (iii)  distilled or conductivity water or water of similar purity (heading 2853). 
	  
More challenging—but much more crucial from an environmental and efficient 
perspective if only because of its sheer size—is the freshwater case.  Freshwater 
could be divided into two components:  bulk water traded via pipeline or ships, and 
“virtual” water traded as input of other products, mostly farm products. 
To our knowledge, there is no exhaustive review of how bulk water is treated.  
There are cases of export bans (Canadian water in the NAFTA context).  But, there 
are also cases of trade in bulk water (intra-EU trade cases or projects) and it would be 
interesting to know how EC Customs have treated such bulk water.  However, trade 
in bulk water is costly with the current technologies so that it will represent only a 
small problem for a long time to come.  Finally, the treaties on water sharing among 
countries having access to a large common river (Danube, Nile, etc.) amount mostly 
to quota systems designed in terms of production (“water use”) not of trade stricto 
sensu (less than a third of international water treaties deal with financial or economic 
payments among countries (Dinar, 2008)).  
The core of the water trade problem is thus the treatment of “virtual” water trade.  
For some commentators (WTO 2010), such a trade is still potentially covered by 
WTO principles and rules since the HS 2201-90 code includes ice and snow, two 
forms of freshwater that human beings do not drink except in extreme cases (see 
Table 2).  For other commentators, the general heading under which waters are 
included (the HS 22 code) is beverages, meaning that waters under the WTO 
disciplines should be limited to the forms of water fit for consumption.  This 
argument is not fully convincing because it relies on consumption defined as 
household consumption.  But, today international trade flows are dominated by trade 
in intermediate goods, that is, goods “consumed” by firms for producing other goods.  
Virtual water fits perfectly this dimension. 
2.2 Building a framework for the world water regime 
Such a context raises two questions.  Which would be the principles and rules 
of the world trade regime that the world water regime should borrow because it will 
benefit from them?  Which are the specific rules that the world water regime should 
establish?  These questions suggest that the world water regime could rely on three 
main pillars illustrated in Figure 1:  
• the WTO principles of non-discrimination (national treatment and 
most-favoured nation (MFN) which do not need to be adjusted in order to fit the 
needs of the world water regime; 
• a series of WTO rules which should be adjusted in order to fit the needs of 
the world water management; 
• and a specific water agreement which would answer questions specific to the 
water issue with no real equivalent in the trade regime. 
  
Figure1. Organizing the world water regime 
WTO Principles
(Non discrimination)
WTO Rules
(Adjusted to fit water 
specificities)
National 
Treatment MFN LabellingSubsidies
World water regime
Specific water agreement
International water pricing
 
 
The following sections examine in more detail these three pillars.  
2.3 The two fundamental WTO principles 
There are two fundamental WTO principles—“national treatment” (NT) and 
“most-favoured nation” (MFN)—which, combined, define the “non-discriminatory” 
approach which is the basis of the modern world trade regime run under the 
GATT/WTO aegis. 
The MFN principle (GA Article I) requires that a country imposes the same tariff 
on the imports of a given good independently from the country of origin. The General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs is both a text (hereafter GA) and an institution (the 
GATT Secretariat, hereafter the GATT).  The WTO is the heir of both the GA and 
the GATT. This principle is already de facto applied on virtual water since most 
tariffs imposed on farm products are MFN. There is an exception to the MFN 
principle, namely the possibility to conclude “free trade agreements” of various kinds 
under GA Article XXIV.  Water trade benefits such preferential duties (often zero) 
to the extent that FTAs cover farm trade—but most FTAs do not cover farm trade.  
As MFN virtual water tariffs tend to be high (see Table 2), the zero-tariff FTAs are 
likely to generate large distortions in the virtual water trade flows—reducing the trade 
flows from countries outside the FTAs (for instance, non-EC countries) and 
increasing the trade flows from inside the FTAs (for instance, among EC Member 
States) independently from the water resources available inside and outside the FTA 
under scrutiny.  This feature illustrates the importance of the benefits from the MFN 
principle in the water case. 
The NT principle (GA Article III) requires that a country should impose the 
same domestic tax(es) on the goods imported and on the “like-products” produced 
domestically.  In other words, NT intends to create a level playing field between 
foreign and domestic products in domestic tax matters.  It is necessary to avoid that a 
progressive liberalization via tariff cuts would be eroded by increases of domestic 
taxes on foreign products alone.  In the current trade regime, virtual water is covered 
by NT since the products in which water is included are covered. 
These two non-discrimination principles often generate negative reactions 
because they seem to limit considerably the sovereignty of a country.  This is 
particularly the case when precious natural resources, like water, are at stake.  This 
impression flows from two totally different, but convergent, perspectives that are 
worth examining briefly. 
First, the water community focuses on the (economically attractive) idea of a 
“world price” for water (as the climate community looks often to a world price for 
CO2).  An unique world price of water would prevail when all the marginal costs of 
using water in the vast world would be equalized.  Of course, this situation would 
probably never be reached for a couple of reasons.  First is that water prices should 
reflect the different water qualities available in the world (as there are different 
quality-adjusted oil prices).  Second, an unique quality-adjusted world price of water 
would require strict conditions to be met, such an instantaneous and pefect 
information on all the water markets in the world as well as instantaneous and perfect 
interconnections of all the water markets in the world.  However, a “world price” for 
water is a concept useful to keep in mind in order to remember that the various world 
prices in the world will interact and, to some extent, may converge—in particular 
under the influence of trade in water.  However, this purely economic approach 
relies on the political illusion (today) that the world is an unified entity.  The COP15 
has clearly revealed how much the real word is a multilateral forum where each 
country is unapologetic to defend its own interests at the expense of the other 
countries.  This does not mean that, in a distant future, there will not be one world 
price for water.  But, it will be the result of a long process of building interconnected 
markets.  Indeed, there is a clear parallel between the long road ensuring a 
progressive convergence of domestic water prices to a world water (positive) price 
and the long road ensuring a progressive convergence of national tariff cuts to 
worldwide zero tariffs. 
Since its origin, the WTO has evolved in a multilateral world, where the 
MFN/NT principles aim at helping all the countries to converge to the economically 
attractive one world (meaning no trade barriers at all in the very long run) while 
leaving some room for the countries’ strongest interests via flexible rules (described 
briefly below). 
Second, the GATT/WTO history conveys a very realistic view of the limits of 
the national governments.  Trade policies are the endless tale of governments 
captured by vested domestic interests.  They show the limits of the “internal” 
sovereignty of governments—their inability to balance the various domestic interests 
in a fair way and their propensity to favour the most aggressive (even if they are very 
small in numbers of people) lobbies.  It happens that the water sector is at the 
crossroads of two extremely powerful lobbies—water firms and, above all, farmers.  
Import-competing farmers will try to reduce virtual trade below its optimal level (i.e., 
a level based on sound economic concerns) while exporting farmers will try to inflate 
virtual trade above its optimal level.  The extent to which the MFN/NT principles are 
an obstacle to the risks of water policies being captured by domestic vested interests 
makes them crucial for the water community as well as for the trade community.
	  2.4 Flexibility of the WTO rules 
That the WTO principles offer a robust framework for an international water 
regime does not mean that the current WTO rules (i.e., disciplines subordinate to the 
non-discrimination principles) are flexible and sufficient enough to address all the 
specific issues raised by the water sector.  Three main issues deserve attention. 
2.5 Non-discrimination, “like” product and water labelling 
The first question is about water “quality”.  Not depleting the current stock of 
water does not necessarily mean that water quality is kept intact or improved.  It is 
well known that, if the agricultural policies of the rich countries have not—so 
far—seriously reduced global water availability, they have often been dramatically 
detrimental to water quality due to excessive use of fertilizers, negative externalities 
caused by “industrial” cowsheds or pigsties, etc. 
In the WTO usual approach, non-discrimination makes sense when applied to 
“like-products”, with “likeness” being defined by the tariff line describing a product.  
In short, two products pertaining to the same tariff line are assumed similar. 
This crude but pragmatic approach ignores the key question of the process and 
production methods (PPMs) that is crucial for the water community.  Is a product 
having used clean water similar to a good having used polluted water?  In more 
general terms, should not one pay attention to the “water footprint” of farm products?  
These questions are legitimate, especially when water use is reaching the 
sustainability threshold in many regions in the world. The debate in the water case has 
not exactly the same intensity than in the climate case.  Winds make “clean” air 
easily a worldwide public good.  As stressed in the introduction, clean water is a 
more local good—hence much more amenable to national appropriate measures. 
Defining products as different if they have different water contents/qualities 
(because of different production processes) is a prospect that makes the trade 
community very nervous for the following, very basic, reason:  the sheer complexity 
generated by adding the dimension of production processes.  Today, there are 
roughly 10,000 different tariff lines defining “products” in a typical tariff schedule.  
Taking into account the various water production processes capable to obtain each of 
these products would require to define tariff lines in terms of “products times 
production processes”.  Such a challenge is not new in the world trade regime.  
“Rules of origin” which determine the country of origin of a product are creating a 
similar problem.  But, precisely, the trade community is aware about the costs of 
such a complexity.  For instance, the existing rules of origin in the NAFTA context 
are estimated to be equivalent to a price increase of 12 percent [Cadot et al. 2005]. 
The water issue has the capacity to generate such problems to an extent unknown 
before.  Pushed to its extreme, it could easily negate the notion of similar products 
that is so essential in a world economy witnessing an endless expansion of varieties of 
products in order to better satisfy consumers.  The climate literature revealing the 
full extent of the problems of implementing climate change policies in an 
international context is relatively recent [Brenton, Edward-Jones and Jensen 2009, 
Jensen 2010, Moore 2010].  It shows that an unrestrained PPM logic would require a 
gigantic database generating astronomical transaction costs (assuming that the needed 
data would exist).  Such costs would be compounded by the huge risks of corruption 
that are inevitably associated to complexity in an international context.  They would 
also divert attention from the main sources for saving water—appropriate production 
and consumption habits.  Finally, such risks and costs would be (much) higher for 
the emerging and developing countries, whereas those countries should be 
induced—not inhibited—to participate to a world water regime. 
As in the climate case, there is thus a strong need to strike a delicate balance 
between exhaustiveness and similarity [Messerlin 2010] if one does not want to loose 
the savings (gains) brought by international trade of virtual water.  This balance is a 
question largely in the hands of the water community.  It is in the interest of the 
water community both to ensure water quality and to favor the best use of the existing 
water resources by allowing freer trade among undistorted domestic water markets. 
A water label has been proposed for handling this issue.  Such a solution would 
respect the balance between exhaustiveness and similarity if it is limited to the few 
highly water-intensive commodities, such as rice, cotton, paper or cane sugar, as 
already suggested [Hoekstra 2010].  A water label is compatible with the WTO 
principles of non-discrimination as long as it is defined on a scientific basis, a 
condition likely to be met if the label is defined by an international agreement on 
water-labelling—the equivalent of the Codex Alimentarius for food products.  Of 
course, WTO-compatibility does not mean that water labelling would be easy to do, 
hence would be desirable (Hoff et al. 2010).  It simply states that such a road, if 
found desirable, is possible within WTO-compatible rules. 
As it is allowed by the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 
a country could adopt a stricter definition of water quality as long as such a definition 
would be based on clear scientific justifications—a condition the main goal of which 
is to ensure that the country avoids to create “unnecessary” obstacles to water trade. 
2.6 Water footprint and international water pricing control 
It is argued that the limited availability of freshwater in the world implies a 
ceiling for human kind’s water footprint.  This situation has been understood as 
requiring that the global water stock should be “fairly” shared among countries by 
creating an international water-footprint permit system (that is, by issuing permits per 
country) (Hoekstra 2010). 
The WTO legal framework per se has little to say on such a scheme.  But, the 
experience of the trade community suggests that such a proposal faces two problems.  
First is political.  It is hard to imagine that water-rich countries would surrender their 
sovereignty on their existing domestic stocks of water.  As underscored above, such 
a proposal relies on the view that we live in an unified world—not in a multilateral 
one.  The second problem is the allocation process of water permits.  The half 
century-long experience of the trade community is that quotas (permits) are the most 
difficult instrument to handle for allocating scarcity in an international environment, 
and that, as a result, they often end up as a unfair and perverse tool.  Unfair because 
they tend to favor the most powerful countries at the time of their creation.  Perverse 
because they create rents that give to their initial beneficiaries a massive leverage 
(power and money) for keeping unchanged the initial scheme while the world is 
changing. 
Much more attractive would be efficient systems of water-pricing at the local and 
national level, converging progressively to a world price of water (adjusted for water 
quality as said above).  The water community underscores that there is a huge 
opposition to “pay for water” [Catley-Carlson 2010].  However, this opposition at 
large seems declining in developed countries, and focusing on the question of whether 
the existing pricing system is well conceived and/or implemented (rather than on the 
principle to pay).  However, unsurprisingly, there is one strong core exception to this 
evolution:  the farmers who are the main users of water. 
An international water pricing agreement would not be inconsistent with the 
WTO if it does not create discrimination among countries—and there is no reason that 
it does want to do so.  Such an agreement may be hard to negotiate when many 
countries have no domestic pricing mechanism and when there is a strong opposition 
by farmers.  One way to accelerate the creation of domestic pricing schemes would 
be to rely on international institutions that will be increasingly involved in the water 
issue.  The World Bank and key regional banks (African Development Bank, Asian 
Development Bank, etc.) could lay down more systematically the basic components 
or guidelines for creating and managing domestic markets in water.  Such a 
non-governmental initiative could then serve as a basis for an international pricing 
agreement that countries would join when they start to run their water markets in an 
efficient way. 
2.7 Subsidies, taxes and domestic regulations 
Water is a too multi-faceted product to believe that the introduction of pricing 
and markets would address all these facets.  Subsidies, taxes and domestic 
regulations are likely to be part of a satisfactory solution to domestic efficient water 
regimes. 
There are “bad” and “good” subsidies.  Today, bad subsidies may prevail in the 
water sector.  Too often, farmers benefit from subsidies inducing them to over-use 
water, to create subsidy-based droughts or water-stress, and to destroy alternative 
activities (for instance, water subsidies in the French region of Poitou-Charente have 
hardly hit oyster-producing and fishing activities associated to local rivers) 
(Boulanger 2007). 
The WTO strict disciplines on subsidies having an impact on trade are thus 
useful in the sense that they constitute an obstacle to such bad subsidies.  That said, 
such disciplines are far to be perfect.  First, they do not cover subsidies wasting 
water, but having no impact on trade flows.  Secondly, requirements for the 
subsidizing country to eliminate its subsidies are missing.  Rather, they open the 
possibility for importing countries to impose “anti-subsidy” tariffs on the subsidized 
products from trading partners.  Such measures tend to be imposed mostly by 
countries having import-competing activities (for instance, in farm products) with two 
negative consequences:  such measures are imposed because the import-competing 
farmers are not efficient (with respect to saving water), and they leave a lot of export 
markets to the products using subsidized water. A parallel could be made between 
freshwater and pre-harvested trees.  Both are potential inputs to farm goods (water) 
and wood products (trees).  There is an ongoing saga of trade conflicts about trees 
between the U.S. and Canada, with the U.S. imposing anti-subsidy measures on 
Canadian lumber on the basis that Canadian laws on forests grant implicit subsidies to 
Canadian producers of softwood products. In the first case, trade and water use are 
both hurt—hence the trade and water communities have common interests to improve 
the disciplines.  In the second case, trade is not hurt, but the water community has 
clear interests in improving the rules (and the trade community has nothing to object). 
“Good” subsidies in water may be crucial in the coming years to the extent that 
the sustainability threshold in water use is close to be reached in many places.  Such 
a situation is likely to require public investments and regulations inducing public 
institutions and private firms to invest enough in water “production” and conservation.  
In other words, there is a need to make sure that such subsidies and regulations would 
be immune to the current WTO rules (“non-actionable” in the WTO legal jargon).  
Such exceptions existed (for instance, in the case of research and development) or are 
still existing (in the agricultural sector for developing countries).  But, there is a need 
to review carefully all these exceptions and to craft the new rules in the best interest 
of worldwide water management. 
A last instrument deserves a quick comment.  The WTO rules ban export 
quantitative restrictions, but allow generally export taxes (an awkward situation).  
The ban of export quotas makes sense from a water perspective to the extent that such 
quotas are implicit subsidies to the domestic consumers of water—hence running the 
risks of wasting water (a departure from the world water price).  Allowing export 
taxes introduces distortions in the world economy which were very visible during the 
2007-2008 food crises, caused in part by some exporting countries’ ban of exports 
(Argentina, Vietnam, among others).  Exporting countries of farm products were 
using export taxes to raise the world farm and food prices with adverse effects on the 
importing countries, but also ultimately on their exporters.  Here again, better WTO 
rules are needed. 
3. Concluding remarks 
The paper argues that the two WTO principles of “non-discrimination” are 
necessary for a economically sound water trade.  But they are not sufficient.  Other 
international disciplines will be needed—on labelling, subsidies, taxes and regulations.  
In this respect, the existing WTO rules are roughly what is needed.  But they require 
to be improved in order to better contribute to a more efficient water management 
from the world point of view.  Improving these WTO rules would allow more open 
virtual water markets, and increase the pressures for improving the functioning of 
domestic markets, too much distorted today by the absence of domestic pricing 
mechanisms or by unsound economic policies. 
The flexibility of the WTO rules seems wide enough not to bother too much with 
the GA Article XX on “General Exceptions”.  Some of these GA Article XX 
exceptions could easily fit water issues:  for instance, paragraph (g) on conservation 
of exhaustible resources or paragraph (b) for protecting health.  The key conditions 
for using GA Article XX (not constituting an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries and a disguised restriction on international trade) are consistent 
with the desire to create progressively a worldwide water pricing regime.  But the 
GA Article XX stops short of suggesting adequate measures for really solving the 
problems.  For instance, the true way to conserve exhaustible resources is to make 
adequate investments, hence the need of appropriate rules on subsidies and domestic 
regulations.  The better these rules will be, the lower the need for using the GA 
Article XX will be. 
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